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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the widely held view that expansionary fiscal policy can boost 
consumer and business confidence, which will stimulate private spending and sustain 
economic activity. We find evidence in favor of this conjecture, i.e., cuts in direct taxes 
generate a positive effect on consumer and business confidence, while the same applies in 
cases of higher non-wage government consumption. However, higher government wage 
bills and government investment reduce confidence, possibly because they entail a 
permanent increase in the size of the public sector, which would have to be financed by 
higher future taxes.  
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1. Introduction 
In view of the rapidly evolving downturn in economic activity back in 2008-9, 
several international organizations, like the IMF (IMF, 2009), government officials, press 
commentators and labor union member expressed the view that fiscal policy action was 
urgently needed in order to fend off the risk of a protracted recession (Blanchard and 
Cottarelli, 2008; Corsetti, 2008; Freedman et al., 2009; Krugman, 2008; Trichet, 2009). 
Along the same lines, the Economist in an article headed “The next front is fiscal” on 
October 30
th 2008 clearly stated that “Interest rate cuts are welcome; but as a global 
recession looms the case for fiscal stimulus grows”. 
Several governments around the globe decided to undertake decisive actions by 
means of tax cuts and spending increases with two main goals. The first was to alleviate 
the effects of the economic crisis on low income households, who are the most affected 
by economic crisis, because, since they face binding credit constraints, they are unable to 
sustain their consumption levels. In addition to the Keynesian multiplier effects in 
situations with prevailing frictions – either nominal or real – the main thesis is that 
expansionary fiscal policy in bad times can lead to increases in consumption by relaxing 
binding constraints credit constraints (Aghion et al., 2009; Galí, López-Salido and Vallés, 
2007; Tagkalakis, 2008).  
The second goal was to boost both consumer and business confidence, aiming at 
sustaining economic activity and stabilizing the financial system. It is a widely held view 
that the positive effect on consumer confidence is expected to reduce the risk of 
increasing precautionary saving, thereby leading to higher consumer spending, which in 
turn will sustain domestic demand and safeguard or boost near-term economic growth.
1 In 
the same vein, improvements in business confidence are likely to lead to higher or at least 
sustained investment spending, while also affecting the decisions of firms regarding 
employment.  
The present paper sheds light on the effects of fiscal policy on consumer and 
business confidence, regardless of whether or not it exerts an independent effect on the 
 
1 However, according to the Ricardian view, in a world without frictions, higher spending or lower taxes 
will have to be matched by higher taxes in the future, so consumer spending will not be affected and all 
additional income will be saved.  
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macroeconomy. We build on earlier work by Fuhrer (1993) on the determinants of 
consumer confidence, and on work by Carrol et. al (1994), Howrey (2001), Ludvigson 
(2004) and Easaw et al (2005)  on the predictive content of consumer confidence, and 
assess the effects of different components of taxes and government spending on 
economy-wide confidence indicators. In particular, after controlling for relevant factors, 
we investigate whether higher government spending and/or tax cuts can affect consumer 
and business prospects. That is we examine whether government actions can indeed 
create a “confidence effect”, namely whether an increase in government spending or tax 
cuts can boost confidence, which may then have an indirect effect on private demand (i.e. 
independent of the direct effect of government spending on economic activity). 
We study the effect of fiscal policy on confidence indices rather than on the 
relevant macroeconomic aggregates (consumption and investment) because these survey 
indicators are used to forecast future business cycle movements. Moreover, these 
confidence indices are taken on board by policy makers when designing future policies. 
On top of that, the exact composition of a fiscal consolidation or a fiscal stimulus 
package can have significant confidence effects which can then have important 
implications for the impact of fiscal policy actions on macroeconomic aggregates. For 
example, in the context of a fiscal consolidation program, widespread tax hikes might not 
be perceived well by the general population and the business community, impacting 
negatively on confidence and consequently on economic activity. On the other hand, 
targeted spending cuts, e.g. the governments’ wage bill, might boost confidence because 
they reduce the current and future tax burden of economic agents. In addition, business 
confidence might improve if these spending cuts on the government’s wage bill generate 
competitiveness gains. This will be the case if these developments influence private 
sector wage developments and reduce unit labor costs in the economy at large (Alesina 
and Perotti, 1997). 
Our findings verify the widely-held view that tax cuts and some government 
spending components can boost consumer and business confidence. Reductions in total 
direct and personal direct taxes improve consumer confidence; similarly lower total direct 
and business direct taxes lead to improved business confidence. However, we also find 
that a higher government wage bill and higher government investment reduce consumer  
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confidence, possibly because they entail a permanent increase in the size of the public 
sector, which would have to be financed by future taxes. Surprisingly, we also find that 
increases in indirect taxation improve business confidence, while having an insignificant 
impact on consumer confidence. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
recent literature on the predictive ability of business and consumer confidence indicators. 
Section 3 details the data employed in our analysis and summarizes our empirical 
findings. The last section contains some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Consumer/ business confidence and fiscal policy 
Sentiment indices are widely believed to have predictive content for the 
performance of the macroeconomy.  Some empirical support for this belief is provided by 
research findings which indicate that sentiment measures contain information about 
future changes in the economy beyond what is contained in past values of other available 
indicators (Fuhrer, 1993; Carroll et al. 1994; Ludvigson, 2004). Potential explanations of 
the predictive content of sentiment indicators are that (i) they represent independent 
determinants of key macroeconomic variables, in line with the traditional  Keynesian 
logic (Keynes, 1936); and/or (ii) that they reflect the overall state of the economy, 
without exerting a causal impact on it. 
  Starting with consumer confidence, conventional wisdom holds that households, 
in allocating their disposable income and wealth, observe and take into account 
macroeconomic fluctuations. In particular, sentiments of optimism (pessimism) are the 
result of the way future household income and GDP performance is perceived, signifying 
that a higher (lower) fraction of income is directed towards consumption. Various studies 
have shown that this is in fact the case (Bram and Ludvigson, 1998; Carroll et al., 1994; 
Doms and Morin, 2004; Ludvigson, 2004; Easaw et al, 2005; Howrey, 2001; McNabb 
and Taylor, 2007). These authors establish that there are in fact two links: first, that 
business cycle fluctuations influence consumer sentiment; and second, that changes in 
consumer sentiment lead to changes in households’ savings rates. In particular, the 
precautionary motive for saving depends on the prospects (sentiment) for short term  
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economic growth
2. Therefore, at least on empirical grounds, the marginal propensity to 
consume rises during expansions and falls during contractions, since agents form 
sentiments based on the behavior of national income and, subsequently, these sentiments 
are reflected in their consumption-savings decisions. 
Although business sentiment indices have a similarly long history to that of 
consumer sentiment measures, most empirical work on the predictive content of 
sentiment indices focuses on the latter. However, recent empirical research suggests that 
business sentiment measures may outperform consumer sentiment induces in predicting 
business cycle fluctuations (Bodo, Golinelli, and Parigi, 2000; McNabb and Taylor, 
2007), thereby indicating that both types of confidence measures should be taken into 
account as predictors of future economic activity. Furthermore, recent research has also 
stressed that confidence might turn out to be important, to the extent that it is an 
independence factor affecting cyclical fluctuations along the lines of Keynes’ (1936) 
‘animal spirits’. For instance, Matsusaka and Sbordone (1995) present evidence that 
consumer confidence is important in accounting for GNP variability. 
As far as fiscal policy is concerned, conventional wisdom holds counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy is appropriate, since governments may use their budget to stabilize the 
macroeconomy. During recessions, the government raises the rate of growth of spending 
to stimulate economic activity, while in expansions the growth rate of government 
consumption is contained. Empirical evidence seems to support this view. For instance, 
Gali and Perotti (2003) find evidence of that fiscal policy is becoming increasingly 
counter-cyclical over time for countries in the EMU, while similar results seem to hold 
for other developed countries (see also Mackiewicz (2006)).  
However, Gordon and Leeper (2005) suggest that during a recession, a counter-
cyclical policy may change agents’ expectations, since it increases public indebtedness 
(raising future debt service payments); as agents foresee that taxes must rise in the future, 
they adjust their savings rates accordingly. In this context, the response to expected future 
policies may lead to recessions that are deeper and lengthier. Gordon and Leeper (2005) 
 
2 Souleles (2004) found that consumer sentiment data (Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment) help 
predict household expenditure. Higher confidence was correlated with less saving, consistent with 
precautionary motives and increases in expected future resources. This finding of excess sensitivity runs 
counter to the permanent income hypothesis.   
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also highlight that this expectations channel may create business cycles that would simply 
not exist if a counter-cyclical policy was not adopted. Furthermore, recent research by 
Mertens and Ravn (2009) makes a clear distinction between the anticipated and the 
unanticipated effects of fiscal policy, highlighting that the impact of anticipation could 
actually be to depress the economy until the fiscal changes are implemented. 
Our aim in the following section is to estimate the effects of fiscal policy changes 
on consumer and business confidence, therefore bridging the above two strands of the 
literature, regardless of whether confidence indicators are merely good predictors of 
future economic activity or independent sources of business cycle fluctuations. 
 
3. Empirical findings 
3.1 Data and background analysis 
In our work we aim at quantifying the effects of fiscal policy on consumer and business 
confidence, building on prior work that examines the determinants of consumer 
confidence (e.g. Fuhrer (1993)). To this end we employ quarterly data for 9 OECD 
countries for the period running from the first quarter of 1970 to the fourth quarter of 
2007. Our dataset includes data for Australia, Canada, Finland, Ireland, Japan, 
Netherlands, Sweden, UK, and US. The choice of these countries is based on the 
availability of consumer and business confidence indicators and government spending 
variables at a quarterly frequency.  
Our dataset also includes various measures of fiscal policy, including government 
consumption (wage and non-wage consumption) and investment, as well as various 
measures of direct and indirect taxes. In addition, we have also included a set of control 
variables to account for business cycle conditions in each country (the unemployment 
rate, inflation, real GDP growth per capita and asset price movements). This will also 
pick up any automatic response of tax revenues to changing economic conditions. A 
detailed description of the dataset is included in the Appendix. Some descriptive statistics 
of the variables included in the analysis is presented in Table A.1 in the Appendix.  
[Insert Table A.1 about here] 3.2 Empirical specification and results 
In order to obtain estimates of the effects of fiscal policy changes both on 
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particular our control variables include factors that might have an impact on consumer 
and business confidence (Fuhrer, 1993). These are the change in the unemployment rate, 
the growth rate of real GDP per capita, inflation (based on the GDP deflator), the 
quarterly change in aggregate asset prices, and the real long-term interest rate. The fiscal 
policy variables considered are (quarterly changes in) government consumption, non-
wage government consumption and government wage bill, government investment, total 
direct taxes, personal and business direct taxes, and total indirect taxes.  
it v
  Our empirical results for consumer confidence are summarized in Tables 1 and 2, 
the results regarding business confidence are presented in Tables 3 and 4. In particular, 
the tables report the estimated short-run and long-run effects of the variables of interest as 
well as those of some control variables – common across specifications regarding both 
consumer and business confidence.
3
  Let us start the discussion of our results, by first inspecting our findings regarding 
consumer confidence. In particular, Table 1 reports results using some baseline 
specifications, whereas Table 2 reports results breaking down government consumption 
into wage and non-wage components. 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here.] 
                                                 
3 The short-run effects are estimated as the total short-run impact of the variable of interest, namely for each 
variable s as 
4
, 1 (1) 1 s sk k φ φ
= =− ∑ , whereas the long-run effects are estimated as the total long-run impact of 
the variable of interest, namely
44
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When examining the effects of changes in government consumption on consumer 
confidence, we note that these are positive, but invariably insignificant (Table 1). 
However, decomposing this component into wage and non-wage government 
consumption, we get more informative results (Table 2). Increases in the government 
wage bill (increasing wages and/or public sector employment) have a negative and at 
times significant effect. This clearly indicates that consumers perceive additional 
spending on the public wage-bill as an additional unproductive burden, which will have 
to be repaid by means of higher future taxes or reduced productive spending. Conversely, 
additional non-wage related government spending has a positive effect on consumer 
sentiment. This may be so for two reasons: on the one hand it boosts demand (by directly 
increasing government spending), i.e. kick-starting economic activity at times of 
recession (whereas public investment might have a much more delayed effect due to 
implementation lags); on the other hand, it is probably perceived as being reversible or 
implying only a temporary increase in the size of the public sector (contrary to 
permanently higher public employment or wages), thus generating a positive effect on 
consumer sentiment. 
  An increase in government investment has an invariably significant, negative 
effect on consumer confidence. At a first glance, this finding might seem counterintuitive, 
since an increase in public investment enhances the productive capacity of the economy 
and leads to higher productivity growth, which should have a positive effect on consumer 
welfare. However, the counterpart of increased public investment is increased funding 
needs which need to be financed by higher current, but especially future taxes. This 
probably generates a negative effect on consumer sentiment. Alternatively, this effect 
might reflect the fact that the wider population is not benefiting immediately from a pick 
up in government investment, in contrast to the case of a tax cut. It is worth noting that 
the negative effect of government investment on consumer confidence is much less 
pronounced than the positive (negative) impact of non-wage (wage) government 
consumption.   
Turning next to the effects of taxation on consumer confidence, we find that the 
impact of higher total direct and personal direct taxes is negative and highly significant as 
one would expect: Raising the tax burden faced by consumers reduces their disposable  
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income, thereby generating negative welfare effects and impacting negatively on their 
sentiment. On the other hand, we find that the effect of higher indirect taxes is, in general, 
insignificant.
4 Note that the effect of total direct taxes is much more pronounced than that 
of personal direct taxes, government investment and consumption (see Table 1), but is 
weaker than that of non wage (and wage) government consumption (see Table 2).  These 
finding highlight the important role that tax policy changes have on consumer confidence, 
while at the same time indicate that changes in specific spending categories e.g. cuts in 
public spending (such as.the government wage bill) can improve confidence, possibly by 
rendering the consolidation effort sustainable. 
   In Tables 3 and 4 we report our results regarding the effects of key fiscal variables 
on business confidence. To start with, we note that an increase in government 
consumption has no particular effect on business confidence. Similar to our findings 
regarding consumer confidence, we find the effect of non-wage government consumption 
positive while that of the government wage bill negative. However, in both cases the 
estimated coefficients are insignificant. In addition, we find that government investment 
exerts a negative but insignificant effect on business confidence. Note here that one could 
have expected that the initiation of public investment projects, involving the private 
sector, would have a positive effect on business confidence to the extent that these public 
investment projects raise economic growth. Nevertheless, a contrarian view is that public 
investment projects do not have a direct effect on manufacturing (hence on business 
confidence), since they either do not involve specific products in the manufacturing 
sector or the “receipt of payments” might be delayed.  Alternatively, according to the 
standard Keynesian view, an increase in government investment crowds out private 
investment, which will be reflected in lower business confidence. In line with the 
Keynesian argument we do find a negative effect, but the coefficient estimate of 
government investment is not significant. 
 
4 As far as the control variables are concerned, higher real GDP per capita (higher income) and an increase 
in asset prices (higher wealth) are linked with a rise of consumer confidence. The effect of the real interest 
rate and inflation are insignificant, whereas an increase in unemployment, contrary to what one would 
expect, has a positive effect on consumer confidence. We should highlight here though the effects on 
unemployment are at least one order of magnitude smaller that the other effects documented.  
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Regarding the effects of taxation, we find that higher total direct and direct 
business taxes lead to significant reductions of business confidence. However, the effect 
of total direct taxes is much more pronounced. Taken together with the government 
spending estimates, one could interpret these findings as evidence that the overall 
business prospects are negatively influenced by both higher spending and higher direct 
taxes, as they imply an increased tax burden for the business sector (including the cases 
where this is done in order to finance productive public investments). On the contrary, we 
find that higher indirect taxes have a positive effect on business confidence, possibly 
because in most cases these are eventually passed on to consumers via higher consumer 




Building on earlier work on the predictive ability of confidence indicators as well 
as on their effect on the economy, and driven by recent economic developments, this 
paper investigates the effect of fiscal policy on consumer and business confidence. In the 
midst of the ongoing economic and financial crisis several policy makers, international 
institutions and serious policy commentaries have expressed strong views in favor of 
fiscal stimulus measures to boost economic activity. Putting aside the direct effect on 
economic activity from increased government spending, a widely held view is that fiscal 
stimulus will also boost consumer and business confidence, generating a positive effect 
on private demand, which will sustain economic activity and raise the economy out of the 
recession.  
Our findings confirm that view that tax cuts in the form of reductions in personal 
and business direct taxes have a positive effect on consumer and business sentiment, 
 
5 Alternatively, since statutory burden of indirect taxes lies with firms, to the extent that indirect taxes are 
paid only periodically and with significant time lag, firms may take advantage of this “cash-at-hand” for the 
(short) time period before they actually transfer these funds to the government.  
6 Turning to the control variables, higher real GDP per capita (i.e. higher demand), lower inflation and 
higher asset prices have a positive effect on business confidence. The effect of the real interest rate is 
insignificant. Higher unemployment raises business confidence. However, one could expect that increased 
unemployment implies reduced private consumption and reduces the prospect for additional profits. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that increased unemployment implies increased market power in the labor market, 
which translates into reduced labor costs improving business prospects.   
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which is likely to result in increased spending. This is probably the case either because 
these tax cuts are perceived as being temporary support; or because they affect more 
those facing binding liquidity constraints.
7 The same applies when considering increased 
non-wage government consumption, in particular in the case of consumer confidence. 
However, the government wage bill and government investment have negative effects on 
consumer and business confidence, implying that apart from their direct positive stimulus 
on private demand, they may have negative (long-run) indirect effects on private demand, 
as they reduce both consumer and business confidence. A possible explanation is that 
both are perceived as permanent, i.e., reflecting a larger public sector in the future. This 
would consequently have to be financed by means of increased taxes generating negative 
effects on consumer and business sentiments, as expectations about future disposable 
income become worse. 
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We use quarterly data over the period 1970 Q1 -2007 Q4 for nine OECD 
countries: Australia, Canada, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, UK, and US. 
These countries are chosen because of the availability of consumer and (mostly 
manufacturing) business confidence data. The dependent variables used are the change in 
the log of consumer and business confidence. The consumer and business confidence 
indicators are seasonally adjusted and are taken from the Key Economic Indicators of the 
OECD. Both consumer and business confidence indicators (which are a balance of 
positive over negative results-qualitative responses, e.g. better or worse economic 
conditions, and increased or decreased orders and production) have been standardized by 
the OECD, i.e. they are also adjusted to be comparable across countries (see OECD, 
2009a). Comparability has been achieved by careful selection of national indicators, and 
by smoothing, centring, and amplitude adjusting these series. 
Business and consumer confidence surveys are typically based on a sample of enterprises 
or households and respondents that are asked about their assessments of the current 
situation and expectations for the immediate future. For enterprise surveys, this concerns 
topics such as production, orders, finished goods stocks, exports raw material, rate of 
capacity utilization, employment etc. In the case of consumer surveys their intentions 
concerning major purchases, the economic situation now compared with the recent past 
and expectations for the immediate future (household’s financial situation and savings, 
general economic situation, unemployment).  
The control variables used are: the change in the unemployment rate, the change 
in the log of the real GDP per capita, the change in the log of the GDP deflator (inflation 
rate) and the change in the log of the aggregate asset prices. With the exception of the 
asset price variable all variables are taken from the OECD (2009b). The asset prices 
indices were kindly provided by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). The main 
indicator is a measure at the change in the log of the quarterly aggregate real asset prices 
and combines price indices for three asset classes - equities, residential property and 
commercial property – by weighting the components using shares of the asset classes in  
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private sector wealth. The private consumption deflator is used to convert nominal to real 
asset prices.  
The fiscal variables used were also taken from the OECD (2009b). The definitions 
used are: change in the log of government consumption, change in the log of government 
wage bill, change in the log of non-wage government consumption, change in the log of 
government investment, change in the log of total direct taxes, change in the log of 
personal direct taxes, change in the log of direct business taxes, change in the log of total 
indirect taxes. The decomposition of government consumption into wage and non wage 
components does not involve Australia, so Tables 2 and 4 present estimates based on the 
other eight OECD countries.  
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Tables 
Table 1 Dependent Variable is Change in Consumer Confidence 
      [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]





0.004*    
[1.82] 
0.003*    
[1.68] 
0.003    
[1.64] 
0.003*    
[1.66] 




0.004*    
[1.85] 
0.003    
[1.45] 
0.003    
[1.42] 
0.004*    
[1.73] 
0.006***    
[3.13] 
Change in real GDP 
per capita 
0.139    
[1.34] 
0.135   
[1.35] 
0.168    
[1.61] 
0.161    
[1.61] 
0.191*    
[1.85] 
0.187*    
[1.85] 
0.193*    
[1.72] 
0.186*    
[1.73] 
0.230**    
[2.18] 
0.221**    
[2.18] 
0.224*    
[1.95] 
0.083    
[0.86] 
Inflation rate [GDP 
deflator] 
-0.113 
[-1.50]    
-0.111 
[-1.52]   
-0.111 
[-1.24]   
-0.107 
[-1.25]   
-0.089 
[-0.97]    
-0.087 
[-0.98]    
-0.104 
[-1.13]    
0.033    
[0.31] 
-0.067 
[-0.67]    
-0.065 
[-0.67]     
-0.094 
[-0.94]    
-0.040 
[-0.47]    
Change in real aggr. 
asset prices 





[1.70]    
0.034*    
[1.71] 
0.045** 
[2.29]    
0.044** 
[2.30]     
0.040**    
[1.97] 
0.038**    
[2.00] 
0.046**    
[2.30] 
0.044**    
[2.32] 
0.041**    
[1.99] 
0.007    
[0.48] 
Real long term 
interest rate 
0.015    
[0.48] 
0.014    
[0.48] 
0.010    
[0.31] 
0.009     
[0.31] 
0.038    
[1.18] 
0.038    
[1.21] 
0.033    
[0.87] 
0.031    
[0.89] 
0.031    
[0.95] 
0.030     
[0.97] 
0.023   
[0.61] 
0.001  
[0.01]   
Change in gov. 
consumption 
    0.034    
[0.50] 
0.033     
[0.50] 
        0.037    
[0.52] 
0.035    
[0.52] 
0.049  
[0.69]   
0.045    
[0.75] 
Change in gov. 
investment 
        -0.034**  -0.033** 
[-2.05]    [-2.05]   
-0.036**  -0.035** 
[-2.13]     [-2.14]    
-0.037** 
[-2.18]    
-0.028* 
[-1.96]    
Change in total direct 
taxes 
           -0.100***  -0.098***  
[-3.41]    [-3.34]   
-0.100***  -0.096*** 
[-3.40]     [-3.35]    
Change in personal 
direct taxes 
            -0.075***  -0.073*** 
[-2.96]     [-3.00]    
-0.074***  -0.051*** 
[-2.94]     [-2.51]    
Change in total 
indirect taxes 
        0.038    
[0.81] 
0.037    
[0.81] 
0.031    
[0.66] 
0.030     
[0.66] 
0.024     
[0.50] 
0.0231    
[0.50] 
0.018   
[0.38] 
0.057 
[1.39]    
                   
R-squared  0.4272            0.434 0.448 0.446 0.456 0.453
Nobs  926            920 926 914 920 908
The specification of the model estimated is of the form  ,, , , 11 ()l n () ()
== ∆ =++ + + ∑∑
gz nn
ci t i t i g j i t l z l jl Lc o n f L x L z φµ λ φφ i t i t v , where  , j it x is fiscal policy variable j and   is 
control variable l for country i at time t, the polynomials in the lag operator for each variable are of the form 
, li t z
4
, 1 () 1
k
ss k k L L φφ
= =− ∑ ,  i µ denotes country fixed-effects, 
t λ denotes time effects,  is an error term, and the dependent variable is the change in consumer confidence.. The short-run effects are estimated as  it v (1) s φ , whereas the long-
run effects are obtained as  (1) / (1) sc φ φ . The table reports the estimated parameters (estimated by OLS) with robust t-statistics in square brackets. One, two, and three 




Table 2 Dependent Variable is the Change in Consumer Confidence 
  [1] [2] [3] 
Regressors  SR LR SR LR SR LR 
Change in 
Unemployment rate 
0.002    
[0.92] 
0.002    
[0.90] 
0.001    
[0.71] 
0.001    
[0.70] 
0.003    
[1.15] 
0.004*    
[1.81] 
Change in real GDP 
per capita 
0.073    
[0.69] 
0.071    
[0.69] 
0.123    
[1.15] 
0.119    
[1.15] 
0.115    
[0.99] 
0.029     
[0.29] 
Inflation rate [GDP 
deflator] 
-0.095 
[-1.06]    
-0.093 
[-1.06]    
-.0298    
[-0.30] 
-0.029   
[-0.30]   
-0.058 
[-0.59]    
-0.024  
[-0.27]   
Change in real aggr. 
asset prices 
0.032    
[1.63] 
0.032    
[1.63] 
0.043**    
[2.13] 
0.042**    
[2.13] 
0.037* 
[1.76]    
0.013    
[0.76] 
Real long term interest 
rate 
0.021    
[0.68] 
0.021    
[0.68] 
0.035 
[1.06]    
0.034    
[1.07] 
0.029    
[0.78] 
-0.077 
[-1.46]    
Change in non wage 
gov. consumption 
0.114**    
[2.31]  
0.112**    
[2.31] 
0.114**    
[2.28] 
0.110**    
[2.27] 
0.121**    
[2.37] 
0.119**    
[2.57] 
Change in wage gov. 
consumption 
-0.112   
[-1.60] 
-0.110  
[-1.60]    
-0.099   
[-1.38]  
-0.095 
[-1.38]    
-0.106 
[-1.46]    
-0.143** 
[-2.27]    
Change in gov. 
investment 
-0.039** 
[-2.32]    
-0.038** 
[-2.35]    
-0.042** 
[-2.49]    
-0.041** 
[-2.52]   
-0.040** 
[-2.34]    
-0.027*  
[-1.82]   
Change in total direct 
taxes 
      -0.071** 
[-2.33]    
-0.068** 
[-2.31]    
  
Change in personal 
direct taxes 
     -0.040   
[-1.50]   
-0.035 
[-1.61]    
Change in total indirect 
taxes 
   -0.015 
[-0.30]    
-0.014 
[-0.30]    
-0.013 
[-0.27]    
-0.011    
[-0.27] 
        
R-squared  0.490 0.499 0.497 
Nobs  791 791 779 






       
 
 
Table 3 Dependent Variable is the Change in Business Confidence 
      [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Regressors  SR LR            SR  LR SR  LR SR  LR SR LR SR LR
Change in
Unemployment rate 
  0.013***    
[3.03] 
0.011*** 
[3.21]    
0.013***    
[2.95] 
0.010***   
[3.12] 
0.012***   
[2.87] 
0.010***    
[3.02] 
0.013***    
[2.91] 
0.010*** 
[3.08]    
0.012***   
[2.77] 
0.010***   
[2.92] 
0.012***   
[2.81] 
0.010***    
[2.96] 
Change in real GDP 
per capita 
0.321*    
[1.78] 
0.255* 
[1.83]    
0.339*    
[1.81] 
0.271*   
[1.87] 
0.338*    
[1.77] 
0.266    
[1.82]* 
0.271    
[1.43] 
0.217    
[1.45] 
0.372*    
[1.89] 
0.294*    
[1.94] 
0.317    
[1.61] 
0.254    
[1.64] 
Inflation rate [GDP 
deflator] 
-0.257* 
[-1.87]    
-0.204* 
[-1.90]    
-0.280* 
[-1.85]    
-0.224* 
[-1.84]   
-0.352** 
[-2.32]    
-0.277** 
[-2.35]    
-0.340** 
[-2.22]    
-0.272** 
[-2.26]    
-0.346 
[-2.15]**    
-0.274** 
[-2.15]    
-0.318** 
[-1.98]    
-0.255** 
[-1.99]     
Change in real aggr. 
asset prices 
0.037    
[1.54] 
0.029    
[1.53] 
0.039*    
[1.67] 
0.031    
[1.65] 
0.055**    
[2.23] 
0.043**    
[2.20] 
0.053**    
[2.15] 
0.042**   
[2.09] 
0.056**   
[2.31] 
0.044**   
[2.27] 
0.054**   
[2.23] 
0.043**    
[2.16] 
Real long term 
interest rate 
-0.058 
[-1.09]   
-0.046    
[-1.10] 
-0.058  
[-1.12]   
-0.047 
[-1.14]   
-0.024 
[-0.45]    
-0.019 
[-0.45]    
-0.039 
[-0.75]    
-0.032 
[-0.75]    
-0.029 
[-0.56]    
-0.023 
[-0.57]    
-0.047 
[-0.90]    
-0.037 
[-0.91]    
Change in gov. 
consumption 
    0.090    
[0.72] 
0.072    
[0.71] 
        0.059    
[0.51] 
0.047    
[0.50] 
0.047    
[0.40] 
0.038    
[0.40] 
Change in gov. 
investment 
        -0.032  -0.026 
[-1.18]     [-1.17]   
-0.032  -0.025 
[-1.16]     [-1.14]    
-0.035 
[-1.26]    
-0.028 
[-1.24]    
Change in total direct 
taxes 
           -0.111***  -0.087*** 
[-2.70]     [-2.73]    
-0.109***  -0.086*** 
[-2.63]     [-2.67]   
Change in direct 
business  taxes 
             -0.028
[-1.86]*    
-0.022* 
[-1.80]    
-0.028*  -0.022* 
[-1.82]     [-1.76]    
Change in total 
indirect taxes 
        0.153**    
[2.20] 
0.120**    
[2.19] 
0.119* 
[1.70]    
0.095* 
[1.70] 
0.147**   
[2.07] 
0.116**   
[2.07] 
0.115    
[1.62] 
0.093    
[1.63] 
                  
R-squared  0.507            0.514 0.527 0.526 0.537 0.536
Nobs  842            836 842 842 836 836
The specification of the model estimated is of the form  ,, , , 11 ()l n () ()
== ∆ =++ + + ∑∑
gz nn
ci t i t i g j i t l z jl Lc o n f L x L z φµ λ φφ l i t i t v , where  , j it x is fiscal policy variable j and   is 
control variable l for country i at time t, the polynomials in the lag operator for each variable are of the form 
, li t z
4
, 1 () 1
k
ss k k L L φφ
= =− ∑ ,  i µ denotes country fixed-effects, 





Table 4 Dependent Variable is the Change in Business Confidence 
  [1] [2]  [3] 
Regressors  SR LR  SR  LR  SR  LR 
Change in 
Unemployment rate 
0.011***    
[2.62] 
0.009***   
[2.68] 
0.010**   
[2.51] 
0.009**   
[2.57] 
0.010**   
[2.48] 
0.009**    
[2.53] 
Change in real GDP 
per capita 
0.311*    
[1.65] 
0.259*    
[1.70] 
0.320*    
[1.62] 
0.261*   
[1.67] 
0.296    
[1.49] 
0.247    
[1.52] 
Inflation rate [GDP 
deflator] 
-0.280**    
[-2.05] 
-0.233 
[-1.99]**   
-0.338** 
[-2.28]   
-0.275** 
[-2.20]   
-0.292** 
[-1.99]    
-0.243* 
[-1.94]    
Change in real aggr. 
asset prices 
0.023    
[1.07] 
0.019 
[1.07]    
0.0468*   
[1.93] 
0.038*   
[1.94] 
0.041*    
[1.82] 
0.034*    
[1.83] 
Real long term interest 
rate 
-0.088* 
[-1.66]    
-0.074* 
[-1.69]   
-0.061 
[-1.16]   
-0.050 
[-1.17]    
-0.085 
[-1.59]    
-0.071 
[-1.62]    
Change in non wage 
gov. consumption 
0.044    
[0.65] 
0.037    
[0.65] 
0.019    
[0.27] 
0.015    
[0.27] 
0.023     
[0.32] 
0.019    
[0.32]    
Change in wage gov. 
consumption 
-0.117 
[-1.14]    
-0.097 
[-1.15]   
-0.146 
[-1.41]   
-0.119 
[-1.43]   
-0.134 
[-1.30]    
-0.111 
[-1.31]    
Change in gov. 
investment 
-0.014 
[-0.56]    
-0.012 
[-0.56]   
-0.008 
[-0.32]   
-0.006 
[-0.32]   
-0.012 
[-0.49]    
-0.010 
[-0.49]    
Change in total direct 
taxes 
   -0.086** 
[-2.10]   
-0.070** 
[-2.13]**   
  
Change in direct 
business taxes 
       -0.026* 
[-1.83]    
-0.024** 
[-2.22]     
Change in total indirect 
taxes 
    0.118*    
[1.65]* 
0.096*   
[1.66]* 
0.086    
[1.21] 
0.072    
[1.21] 
            
R-squared  0.661 0.673  0.672 
Nobs  689 689  689 




Appendix A. Tables 
 
Table A.1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Consumer Confidence  962  0.0002  0.0115  -0.0392  0.0397 
Business Confidence  878  0.0004  0.0162  -0.0794  0.0555 
Unemployment Rate  962  -0.0010  0.3614  -1.9160  1.7773 
GDP per capita  962  0.0057  0.0095  -0.0520  0.0595 
Inflation Rate  962  0.0096  0.0121  -0.0406  0.0737 
Aggregate Asset Prices  962  0.0083  0.0468  -0.2214  0.8159 
Long-Term Real Interest rate  962  0.0640  0.0322  0.0024  0.1666 
Government Consumption  962  0.0176  0.0180  -0.0441  0.1320 
Government Consumption (Wage)  829  0.0151  0.0170  -0.0281  0.1617 
Government Consumption (non 
Wage) 
829 0.0190  0.0249 -0.1094  0.1300 
Government Investment  960  0.0141  0.0521  -0.4235  0.3550 
Total Direct Taxes  962  0.0174  0.0313  -0.2498  0.1752 
Direct Personal Taxes  950  0.0159  0.0396  -0.3153  0.2324 
Direct Business Taxes  944  0.0169  0.1426  -1.8241  1.3821 
Indirect taxes  962  0.0172  0.0193  -0.0996  0.1173 
Notes for Table A.1 The table reports summary statistics of the variables involved in the analysis, in 
particular their quarterly (log) change, apart from inflation and the long-term real interest rate, which 
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